Accountability Hub
Malawi has faced the problem of a hung Parliament since the dawn of multiparty democracy.
A hung Parliament arises when parliamentary elections do not produce a single party with more than half of the seats in Parliament, making it impossible for the party with the highest number of MPs to form a stable government.
The constitutional problem posed by a hung Parliament can be contrasted with that posed by its opposite — special majority Parliament, which gives one political party sufficient representation in Parliament to allow it to change the constitution. If a hung Parliament renders a government unstable and impotent by depriving it of the necessary support for its policies, a special majority Parliament allows the government too much stability to take opposition and public concerns seriously.
Paradoxically, a hung Parliament produces the conditions for greater Executive accountability than a special majority Parliament. However, it is precisely because a hung Parliament opens itself up to too much accountability that it loses the ability to push through it policies.
Thus, the best government (i.e. stable but accountable government) is achieved when an electoral system produces a presidential winner and political party with a sufficient number of MPs exceeding the threshold for a hung Parliament but not that of a special majority.
In Malawi, this has been difficult to achieve due to the prevalence of ethnic and regional politics and the shortage of political leaders with a genuine national agenda. While the problem of a hung Parliament would still exist even if these hurdles were overcome, they make it all the more important that we take this problem seriously.
Parliamentary systems give Parliament the power to choose and fire the president (prime minister). Thus, where there is no clear winner of parliamentary elections; any political party has a chance to enter into a coalition agreement with other parties to gain the required number of seats in Parliament that would allow it form a stable government. It also means that once that government loses that stability, Parliament can pass a vote of no confidence, leading to the dismissal of that government.
In sharp contrast, our Constitution withheld the power to determine who becomes the president from Parliament, and instead vested it directly in the electorate. This means that a president can form a minority government, although it faces the challenge of mustering support in Parliament for its policies and decisions. Furthermore, Parliament cannot fire the president except on few prescribed grounds.
Essentially, the Malawian constitutional model guaranteed a modicum of stability through a directly elected president. It thus allows the president the power to form a government even though that president runs as an independent and does not have MPs, wins the presidential elections with less than 50 per cent of the total votes cast, or his party secures the least number of MPs.
The trouble is that this model has been routinely abused by all former presidents, from Bakili Muluzi and the late Bingu wa Mutharika to Joyce Banda and now Peter Mutharika. Malawian leaders have tended to act as if they have complete freedom regarding the formation of government irrespective of how they won the presidential elections or the number of MPs at their disposal.
This practice is unconstitutional because the Constitution’s foundational values and principles require, at minimum, that every government be sufficiently legitimate, representative, responsive and accountable.
Hence, a president who has less than half the total number of MPs is obliged to work towards a proper coalition government to improve his or her legitimacy. The various political parties and individuals involved have to negotiate a power sharing agreement and agree upon specific and general common goals and policies. The resulting agreement has to be approved by their most authoritative party structures and made public.
Only in this way can we ensure that political parties act within the parameters set by the Constitution, are not used as an engine for personal gain and do not betray the electorate. n
