On public sector reforms

Will they or will they not work? That is the debate. With great pomp and a sumptuous dinner, President Peter Mutharika launched Public Sector Reforms Agenda. They had been crafted by a committee headed by Vice-President Saulos Chilima. What was not highlighted were the previous, 79 unsuccessful attempts at public reforms.

Chilima had inadvertently said who the devil was but quickly got wiser and never said it again. He had blamed political interference. He had realised that the only person who interferes in the public service is a President.

The  main  problem  with  our  public  services  is  wrong  people  in  wrong  jobs  because  of political  appointments,  transfers  or  dismissals   made  through  presidential  directives.  In short, political interference.  The  public  services  do  not  provide the  secure,  rewarding,  professional,  respected  and  pensionable  careers  they  used  to.

There  is  widespread  demoralisation  and  frustration  when  Public  Service  Regulations  are  flouted  and  blue-eyed,  mostly  incompetent  and  inexperienced  people  associated  with  the  ruling-party,  even  from  outside  the  public  services, are catapulted  into  senior  positions.  The career  public  servants  lose  hope  of  advancement  in  a  rat-race  where  political  colour  rather  than  merit  counts.  Their aspirations are killed.  They do not work hard enough to become PS  one day.  In  short,  they  do  not  provide  Malawians  with  quality,  public  services.

The  Reforms  Commission  did  not  identify  political  interference  as  the  cause  of  demoralisation  and  frustration  in  the  public  services  and  then  offer  solutions.

In  its  profound  wisdom  the  Reforms  Commission diplomatically  avoided  the  issue.  Instead,   it rightly identified inefficiency in ministries as the problem.  It   prescribed performance agreements as the solution.   It  set  down  specific  tasks  to  be  achieved  by  each  ministry,  much  the  same  way  individuals   face  performance  appraisals  and  submit   report-cards  to  bosses  in  the  private  sector.  That was exactly what all the pomp was about.

We  all  know  that  institutions  are  not   inefficient  but  individuals  in  institutions  are. What  was  left  vague  was  whose  neck  was  on  the  block  if  the  task  was  not  performed.  Would  it  be  the  neck  of  the  minister,   the  PS   or  someone  else?

The  Reforms  Commission  did  not  explain  how  performance  agreements  in  a  ministry  will  restore  high  morale,  pride,  confidence,  commitment  and  aspirations  in  the  career  public  servants  of  that  ministry  for  the  desired  efficiency  to  be  achieved.  It  did  not  explain  how  an  incompetent,  political  appointee  will  be  efficient  if  presented  with  a  performance  agreement.

We  all  know  that  inefficiency  is  the  result  of   some  underlying  malaise.  If  we  tackle  inefficiency  without  tackling  its  causes,   then  we  are  treating  the  symptom  and  leaving  the  disease  untreated. So long as  the career  public  servants  are  demoralised  and  frustrated  or  the  public  services  are  headed  by  incompetent,  inexperienced,  political  appointees  there  will  be  inefficiency.

What  needs  to  be  reformed  first  is  the  system  that,  without  any  legal  authority  other  than  presidential  directives,  creates  over  90 principal  secretaries  in  a  government  of  only  20 ministries;   creates  so  many  deputy  governors  at  the  Reserve Bank;   puts  20 000  chiefs  on  the  public  payroll;  appoints  a  budget  director  who  brews  up  cashgate;  appoints  or  promotes  some  without  going  through  the  Civil  Service  Commission;  changes  the  Police  Inspector General,  the  Director  of  Public  Prosecutions,  the  Anti-Corruption Bureau director  and  others  like  bed-linen;    and  so  forth.  That  is  the  system  which  needs  drastic  reforms  urgently.

Obviously,  a  rat  cannot   tell  a  cat   about  the  need  to  tie  a  bell  on  him.  That is why the Reforms Commission skirted around the issue.  It left the cause untreated but addressed the effect.

We  need  to  persuade  our  Presidents  to  get  their  hands  off  our  public  services.  We  need  to  educate  our  presidents  that  there  is  no  room  for  presidential  directives  in  a  multi-party  democracy  because  the  only  room  available  is  for  rule of law.

That  message  cannot  be  delivered  by  a  Reforms  Commission  which  is  appointed  by  the  President  and   headed  by  his  Vice-President.

The Malawi Civil Service is an organisation.  Like  all  organisations  it  has  form  and  function  or  structure, systems,  procedures  and  staffing-levels.  Its function is to provide various services to Malawians. What  we  call  management  in  the  private sector  is  called  administration  in  the  civil  service.  A  manager  in  a  company  is  called  administrator  in  the  civil  service.

A  section  in  the  civil  service  is  headed  by  a  supervisor.  Several sections form a department headed by a director.  Several  departments  form  a  ministry  which  is  headed  by  a  principal  secretary.  The  PS  is  the  administrative head  of  the  ministry  while  the  minister  is  the  political head  of  that ministry.

The  President  appoints  the  minister  to  ensure  that  the  policies of  his  political  party  are  carried  out  in  that  ministry.

The  PS  provides  all  the  administrative  support-services  to  the  professionals  of  his  ministry  to  ensure  that  they  provide   quality  services  but  in  accordance with  the  policies  of  the  ruling-party.

Each section or department has a staffing level called establishment. It can have vacancies but cannot be overstaffed. There cannot be two people on one job. Promotions are competitive.   Each post has a grade with a gazetted salary-scale.Dismissals or demotions come after disciplinary hearings.

The  President  appoints the Civil  Service Commission from among  leading  Malawians  who  have  vast  experience  and  knowledge  of  the  civil  service.  It  is  the  Civil  Service  Commission  which  advertises  vacancies,  interviews  applicants,  recruits,  trains,  appoints,  appraises,  promotes,  transfers  and  disciplines  all  civil  servants,  in  accordance  with  established,  legal  procedures.  It  is  not  the  minister  or  the  President  who  does  that.

All  the  other  public  services  have  similar  structures,   systems  and  procedures  created  by  Acts  of  Parliament. The police have the Police Service Commission. The defence forces  have  their  own council. The  teaching  service  has  the  Teaching  Service  Commission  and  so  forth.

The President  has  powers  of  approval  of  the  recommendations  of  certain  appointments,  transfers  or  dismissals  made  by  these  commissions  or  boards,  but  has  no  direct  powers  in  all  cases.

For  example,  the  President  of  Malawi  is  also  the  president  of  his  political  party.  Although  he  has  powers  to  appoint  the  Malawi  Electoral  Commission (MEC),  he  has  no  powers  to  appoint  the  CEO  of  MEC  or  any  member  of  the  MEC  Secretariat.  That  is  the  sole  prerogative  of  the  commissioners  themselves  to  ensure  that   MEC  is  politically  neutral.  A  CEO  who  is  appointed  by  the  President  takes  orders  from  the  President   and  Malawi   cannot  have  clean  elections.

If  today  Malawi  has  over  ninety  principal  secretaries  blame  the  Presidents.  The  Civil  Service  Commission  would  have  known  that  Malawi   has  only  20 ministries  and  ministers.

This culture of silence is inimical to the social, political and economic development of Malawi. We all suffer from presidential mistakes. A budget director does not have to be appointed by a president.

The  Malawi  Law Society,   Public  Affairs  Committee (PAC),  Attorney  General,  opposition  parties,  the press  and  all  others  have  a  duty  to  tell   presidents  what  the  law  says  and  what  their  limits  are.  Otherwise   our  public  services  cannot  become the   professional,  efficient  and  incorruptible  organisations  we want  them  to  be.

Our President has the Cabinet as his official and constitutional advisory organ.  In  their  advice  his  ministers  are  backed  by  the  vast  resources  of  knowledge,  experience  and  expertise  of  their  ministries.

But  there  is  a  reason  our  presidents  sometimes  ignore  these  official  organs.  Their friends tell them to.  The worst occupational hazard of presidents is their own friends.  Party   supporters want gravy.  Friends and family want favours. They all offer unsolicited advice.

Gregory Rasputin was a semi-literate peasant   in Imperial Russia.  He  left  his  village  for  the  Capital  and  ended  up  in  the  Imperial  Palace.  The  reason  was  that  the  Royal  Family  had  a  sickly  son  whom  Rasputin  was  treating  through  his  mystical  powers.

Rasputin  became  the  most  powerful  person  in  Russia  simply  because  he had  tremendous  influence  on  the  Tsarina  who  had  tremendous  influence  on  the  Tsar.  Ministers,  Prime  Ministers,  Army  Generals,  even  Bishops  were  appointed  or dismissed  by  the  Emperor  at  the  instigation  of  Rasputin. The country went into ruin.

One  evening  Rasputin  was  lured  to  the  home  of  an  aristocratic  acquaintance.  He was shot   point-blank but refused to die and fled.  He  was  chased,  finished  off  by  the  river  and  tossed   over  a  bridge  into  the  freezing  water.

But  it  was  too  late  to  repair  the  damage  he  had   done. The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 came.  Communism came. The monarchy was abolished.  The entire Royal Family was slaughtered.

Rasputin  is  an  extraordinary  case-study  in  Political  Science  of  a  power-behind-the-throne.  An  ignorant,  semi-literate  man  changed  the  destiny  and  history  of  Russia  without  holding  any  formal  office.

It  is  temptingly  easy  to  say none  of  this  can  happen  here.  The  truth  of  the  matter  is  that  every  president,  if  not  careful,  gets  used  by  his  associates   for  their  own   purposes.  And  a  president  is  only  as  good  as  the  advisors  he  chooses.

President Peter Mutharika is an academic lawyer by profession.  He is, undoubtedly, aware of these occupational hazards.  He  will  know  when  his  friends  and  family-members   try  to  use  him  for  their  own  purposes. There  is  never  any  shortage  of  people  who  would  like  to  manipulate  a  President  and  become  “powers-behind-the-throne.”  There  is  no  shortage  of  people  who  would  love  an  undeserved  promotion  or  appointment  by  presidential  directive.

The  success  or  failure  of  the  Public  Sector  Reforms   depends  on  President  Mutharika  himself.  How   he  will   or  will  not  use  presidential  directives  in  the  public  services  for  the  benefit  of  his  supporters,  associates,  friends  and  family  will  decide.

*Sam  Mpasu  is  president  of  New  Labour  Party,  former  Speaker  of  National  Assembly  and  former  Cabinet  Minister. He has published several books.