The struggle between successive governments and civil society is neither recent nor confined to one political administration.
From the final years of Bingu wa Mutharika’s presidency through Peter Mutharika’s administration, the Tonse Alliance government and the violence that preceded the 2025 General Election, relations between the State and independent watchdogs have followed a familiar cycle.
Civil society challenges those in power. Governments respond with varying combinations of resistance, intimidation, co-optation or force. Regime change follows, only for the cycle to begin again.
While the actors have changed, the underlying tensions have remained remarkably consistent.
Bingu’s second term: confrontation and bloodshed
The relationship deteriorated sharply during Bingu wa Mutharika’s second term.
As the economy weakened and concerns over governance mounted, civil society organisations intensified calls for political and economic reforms. The government dismissed many of the criticisms, setting the stage for confrontation.
Tensions culminated in nationwide demonstrations on July 20 2011.
The protests, organised by CSOs, were met with resistance from Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) cadets and security forces. Police used live ammunition against demonstrators, leaving 20 people dead, many others injured and hundreds arrested, including protest leaders and civil society activists.
The violence remains one of the darkest chapters in Malawi’s democratic history.
Just months earlier, in April 2011, the government had expelled British High Commissioner Fergus Cochrane-Dyet after a leaked diplomatic cable described Mutharika as becoming increasingly autocratic and intolerant of criticism.
To many observers, both incidents reflected an administration growing less tolerant of dissent.
HRDC protests and the fight over the 2019 election
Nearly a decade later, civil society again found itself at the centre of a national political crisis.
Following the disputed May 21 2019 Tripartite Elections, the Human Rights Defenders Coalition (HRDC) launched sustained nationwide demonstrations demanding the resignation of then Malawi Electoral Commission (MEC) chairperson Jane Ansah.
The coalition argued that Ansah had presided over a flawed electoral process that returned Peter Mutharika to power.
The protests quickly evolved into a broader campaign for electoral accountability.
Senior opposition figures—including Malawi Congress Party leader Lazarus Chakwera and the late Vice-President Saulos Klaus Chilima—frequently attended the demonstrations, reinforcing public perceptions of a shared cause between opposition politicians and civil society.
The protests were not without violence.
In parts of the Southern Region, DPP cadets repeatedly disrupted demonstrations, while HRDC leaders faced intimidation, assaults and repeated arrests on charges that were later dropped after the change of government.
HRDC executive member Billy Mayaya was assaulted in Blantyre in October 2019. His colleagues—the Reverend MacDonald Sembereka, Gift Trapence and then HRDC chairperson Timothy Mtambo—were also arrested during the protests.
Meanwhile, the High Court, sitting as the Constitutional Court, was hearing the election petition filed by Chakwera and Chilima.
On February 3 2020, the court delivered a landmark judgment nullifying the presidential election and ordering a fresh poll.
Although Ansah consistently denied that public demonstrations influenced her decision, she resigned as MEC chairperson on May 21 2020.
A month later, on June 23, Malawians elected Chakwera and Chilima under the Tonse Alliance banner, ending the DPP’s six-year administration.
When watchdogs joined government
For many within civil society, the transition raised uncomfortable questions about the relationship between activism and politics.
Soon after taking office, the Tonse Alliance administration appointed several prominent HRDC figures to senior government and diplomatic positions.
Former HRDC chairperson Timothy Mtambo became Minister of Civic Education and National Unity.
Reverend MacDonald Sembereka was appointed Malawi’s representative to the United Nations in New York, Billy Mayaya was posted to Brussels, while national coordinator Luke Tembo became ambassador to Ethiopia.
The appointments drew mixed reactions.
Supporters viewed them as recognition of individuals who had played a significant role in defending democracy.
Critics saw something different.
Many argued that the appointments blurred the boundary between independent civic activism and partisan politics, reinforcing long-standing concerns that successful civic leaders ultimately become absorbed into government.
The appointments also fuelled criticism that HRDC had become noticeably less confrontational after the change of administration.
Mtambo’s own experience reflected the risks of crossing that divide.
After being dropped during the Tonse government’s first Cabinet reshuffle, he attempted to return to civic activism but encountered scepticism from sections of the public who believed accepting political office had compromised his independence.
Gift Trapence, who succeeded Mtambo as HRDC chairperson and declined a government appointment, also faced criticism from some quarters that the coalition had become less aggressive in holding the Tonse administration to account.
Whether fair or not, the perception illustrated how easily public confidence in civil society can be damaged once organisational leaders enter partisan politics.
The 2025 election violence
Questions about shrinking civic space resurfaced ahead of the September 16 2025 General Election.
The Centre for Democracy and Economic Development Initiatives (Cdedi), together with other organisations, planned nationwide demonstrations demanding the resignation of MEC chairperson Annabel Mtalimanja and Chief Elections Officer Andrew Mpesi.
The organisers alleged that both officials had links to the governing Malawi Congress Party (MCP), raising concerns about the credibility of the electoral process.
The planned demonstrations in Lilongwe never fully materialised.
Groups of panga-wielding men attacked protesters and civil society leaders in broad daylight, while police were widely criticised for failing to intervene promptly.
Cdedi executive director Sylvester Namiwa was assaulted in full view of police officers.
The violence drew condemnation from Malawi’s international development partners, including the European Union, which warned that continued attacks on civic freedoms could affect future support to the country.
Two days later, President Lazarus Chakwera ordered the Ministry of Homeland Security to investigate the attacks.
The findings, however, were never made public before his administration left office.
Following Peter Mutharika’s victory in the September election, police arrested 11 suspects in November 2025.
The case, which allegedly implicates several former senior Cabinet ministers, remains before the courts.
Questions over the delayed arrests have persisted.
When asked in June 2026 why police only acted after the change of government, Malawi Police Service spokesperson Lael Chimtembo said he needed more time to respond. No further explanation had been provided by the time this article went to press.
Similarly, requests for comment sent in June 2026 to Minister of Information and Communications Technology Shadric Namalomba and former government spokesperson Moses Kunkuyu went unanswered despite repeated follow-ups.
A recurring cycle
Viewed together, the experiences of the past 15 years reveal a striking pattern.
Governments of different political colours have adopted different methods—violent crackdowns, arrests, public vilification, co-optation, political appointments and alleged infiltration—but the underlying objective has often appeared the same: limiting the influence of independent civic voices capable of challenging those in power.
Civil society, meanwhile, has struggled with its own contradictions.
Its greatest victories have sometimes brought its greatest vulnerabilities, as respected leaders crossed into partisan politics and organisations faced growing questions about their independence.
The consequence has been a gradual erosion of public trust in one of democracy’s most important institutions.
The future of Malawi’s civic space
The experiences of the past two decades reveal a troubling paradox.
Every administration has, at one time or another, relied on civil society to defend democratic principles while in opposition. Yet once in power, many have viewed the same organisations with suspicion—or sought to weaken, co-opt or outmanoeuvre them.
Political interference has taken different forms. Some governments have responded with arrests, intimidation or violence. Others have relied on appointments, patronage or the emergence of politically aligned organisations to blunt criticism.
At the same time, civil society has faced its own internal challenges.
Shrinking donor funding, growing political polarisation and public mistrust have made it increasingly difficult for organisations to maintain both financial sustainability and institutional independence.
The rise of “mercenary” CSOs, whether real or perceived, has further blurred the distinction between principled advocacy and partisan activism, weakening public confidence in the sector as a whole.
Ultimately, the greatest casualty is not civil society itself.
It is democratic accountability.
When independent watchdogs lose credibility, citizens lose trusted platforms through which to question authority, expose abuse and demand better governance.
A democracy without strong, independent civil society may continue to hold elections.
But elections alone do not guarantee accountability.
They merely determine who exercises power.
It is an independent civic space—free from intimidation, political capture and financial desperation—that helps ensure power is exercised in the public interest.
As Malawi prepares for another chapter in its democratic journey, the central question is no longer whether civic space is under pressure.
The evidence suggests that it is.
The more urgent question is whether the country is willing to protect one of democracy’s most important safeguards before public trust is eroded beyond repair.
This article was produced with funding from the Hivos Connect! Defend! Act! Programme.
