Public-private partnership (PPP) has become the mantra of development financing.
A PPP can sound like a marriage made in heaven. The government brings regulatory authority, land and a duty to serve, while a private business brings finance, technology and management. Together, they can deliver vital infrastructure faster than government might manage alone.
However, no marriage is secured by a signed certificate alone. It works only when duties are clear, promises are kept and neither partner exploits the other.
The same is true of PPPs. They are not free money, but public infrastructure purchased through long-term contracts. Citizens ultimately pay through taxes, tariffs, tolls or government guarantees.
This is a useful model, with real risks
Across Africa, private capital has helped fill gaps that public budgets cannot. For example, Kenya has expanded electricity generation, Senegal’s Dakar-Diamniadio toll road has eased congestion while South Africa tests projects before approval.
PPPs’ success requires careful preparation, competitive tenders and long-term contract management.
Failures carry the opposite warning. Costly electricity, unaffordable tolls and heavy state liabilities can privatise profit while leaving taxpayers with the loss.
A contract between an experienced company and an underprepared government is partnership in name only.
Malawi adopted PPPs in 2005, approved a policy and law in 2011, established the PPP Commission in 2012 and revised the law in 2022.
The Malawi 2063 pillars—industrialisation, commercial agriculture and urban growth— require reliable infrastructure.
There has been progress. A K2.6 billion partnership with Old Mutual delivered the first 154 university beds in 2021, Digital Malawi has connected public institutions and schools; and the over $1.5 billion Mpatamanga Hydropower Storage Project, backed by a $350 million World Bank grant, will add 361 megawatts to the national grid.
These projects matter and PPPs constitute a shortcut around budget pressure.
However, investors often arrive with seasoned advisers and ill-prepared officials face limited resources, staff turnover and political deadlines.
One weak clause can bind the country for decades.
Secrecy deepens the danger. Citizens may hear the headline cost, but not the guarantees, forex exposure, future tariffs or cancellation payments.
Inflation and kwacha depreciation can preserve an investor’s return, but push essential services beyond people’s reach.
The public also loses when foreign firms provide the finance, equipment and advice while local companies receive minor subcontracts. Assets may be built without building local skills or trust as officials often approach communities when land is required or fees begin.
Malawi can negotiate better. It should become a stronger public partner.
First, no project should proceed without independent tests of need, affordability, environmental and social impact, value for money and long-term fiscal risk.
If ordinary public procurement is cheaper, government should use it.
Second, disclose the essential terms: feasibility findings, winning bids, beneficial owners, guarantees, tariffs, performance standards and amendments.
Commercial confidentiality must protect legitimate business information, not hide public liabilities.
Third, invest in permanent expertise across the PPP Commission, ministries, councils and Parliament. Lawyers, engineers, economists and environmental specialists must be able to challenge advisers and manage contracts throughout their life.
Finally, pay for results, protect affordability and build local value. Contracts should reward services delivered, not ceremonies or construction alone.
Support local jobs, apprenticeships, technology transfer and Malawian suppliers. Communities must shape decisions on land, compensation, tariffs and environmental harm from the beginning.
The public must not be silent. Development is too important to be negotiated in secret. In any PPP, the public must never become the silent partner.
Both government and businesses can waste money or become corrupt. Malawi needs private investment, but it needs strong public institutions even more. A weak state does not become stronger by signing with a powerful company; it may simply lock its weakness into a 30-year agreement.
The best partnerships are openly selected, expertly negotiated, independently scrutinised and judged by what they deliver.
